





Credit Rating Organizations (CROs) are profit-
making firms.Describing them as “agencies”imparts
to their work an undeserved public-service cachet
that has not recently been demonstrated in practice.
Around the world,the enhanced credibility of major
CROs and regulation-induced institutional demand
for highly rated assets supported a disastrous bubble
in privately sponsored securitizations. Widespread
loss of confidence in CROs’ ability to provide accu-
rate ratings for complex securitizations led to the
bubble’s bursting in 2007 and the resulting decline in
the value of asset-backed securities rendered many
institutions deeply insolvent.As individual insolven-
cies deepened and suspicion spread to other similar
institutions, the securitization market collapsed. Far
from demanding new issues, institutions lobbied
their governments to take existing holdings off their
hands at subsidized prices.
The CRO business model is rife with incentive con-
flict. CROs produce benefits for four distinct cus-
tomer groups:issuers,regulated investors,unregulat-
ed investors and regulators. Issuers want the highest
rating they can obtain and to conceal or sugarcoat
adverse information to keep their borrowing costs
low. Unregulated investors and regulators want the
most accurate possible estimates of risk so that they
can safely substitute CRO analysis for their own due
diligence. Regulated investors want the issues they
buy to be as highly rated as possible to conserve reg-
ulatory capital and to maximize the return on the
regulatory capital they hold. Unfortunately, most
investors cannot assess the quality of the analysis
they receive until long after their investment deci-
sions have been made. Regulators can in principle
look carefully into the models and data CROs
employ, but their incentives to do this have not been
strong.
When advances in copying technology persuaded
the CROs to shift from investor-pays to issuer-pays
compensation, these incentive conflicts became
more intense. As the revenue from complex struc-
tured securitizations grew and became concentrated
among a few high-volume issuers, these issuers
gained considerable market power.This power deep-
ened the incentive conflict that CRO managers face.
At the same time,the volume and complexity of new
instruments increased the benefits that investors
could gain from substituting the judgment of trusted
expert analysts for their own due diligence and
increased the ability of regulators to excuse and hide
acts of forbearance. Complexity also increased the
kinds of information an issuer might seek to with-
hold. For years, investor trust in the reputations of
major CROs (Moody’s,Standard & Poors,and Fitch)
was sustained by their reasonably good track record
in rating corporate debt. Government reliance on
ratings in writing financial regulations encouraged
fiduciary institutions to allocate billions of dollars
based on a CROs’ assessments.
CROs add value only to the extent that the informa-
tion they produce improves investors’ ability to
assess and price risk. When CRO ratings of compli-
cated securitizations revealed themselves to be wild-
ly inaccurate, asset-backed debt became unattrac-
tive.To prevent this channel of housing finance from
drying up completely, authorities in the US have
been supporting the debt of the government-spon-
sored enterprises (GSEs) that engage in housing
finance. But the massive fiscal deficits this requires
cannot continue indefinitely.
Rebuilding the CRO industry’s lost reputation is by
no means a straightforward task, but it is a problem
that must be solved if markets for securitized assets
are to revive. The volume of securitizations and the
flow of real investment around the world will remain
depressed unless and until CRO firms and authori-
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ties in financial-center countries work out and adopt
a  viable plan for restoring confidence in CROs’ abil-
ity to rate securitizations accurately.
This article reviews the functions of CROs and
explains the details of reforms that are currently
unfolding in the US and Europe.These plans focus on
developing rules and ethical codes that promise to
reduce conflicts of interest, promote transparency and
strengthen disclosure for CROs that operate in specif-
ic nations. While prescriptive legislation and detailed
codes are useful, they inevitably contain loopholes
that generate unexpected and unwanted conse-
quences.We argue that,to be successful,new regulato-
ry structures need to be global and focus on improving
CRO incentives to produce accurate ratings.
A good starting point would be for CROs and
authorities to identify and implement institutionally
a distinction between the fiduciary activity of devel-
oping credit ratings and the profit-making business
of supplying them to customers (Froeba 2009).These
two functions require different forms of regulation
and supervision. Inasmuch as CRO personnel per-
form a certification function much like that of actu-
aries and accountants, they should as a group define
themselves as professionals and go on to develop
and foster a dynamic process for setting ethical and
operating standards whose explicit mission is to
serve the public interest.Government regulation can
play a twofold role in this. First, it can assess how
well, when applied to the securitization process, the
standards align the interests of CROs and issuers
with those of different kinds of investors. Second,
officials can see that the standards adapt to changing
circumstances and are adequately enforced.
The evolution and the usefulness of credit ratings
In response to the collapse of the securitization mar-
ket and the resulting global credit crunch, private
groups and policymakers around the world have
explored a variety of reforms, including even the
possible abandonment of credit ratings.1 To analyze
proposed reforms effectively, it is critical to under-
stand the answers to three fundamental questions:
(1) What functions have CROs served? (2) How did
they achieve credibility historically? (3) How can
they regain their usefulness in markets for asset-
backed securities? The next few paragraphs address
these questions and lay out the context within which
reforms must unfold.
What functions have credit ratings served?
Capital markets do not require CROs.The world had
active bond markets for at least 300 years before the
first CRO came on the scene. But early capital mar-
kets, based largely in Europe, restricted themselves
predominantly to trading sovereign debt issued in
the sovereign’s own currency.For this limited capital
market, credit risk was easy to analyze. CROs could
add little value.
The first CROs were established in the United States
where a robust corporate bond market first emerged
in the mid-nineteenth century. The US financed
much of its growth in canals, railways and other
infrastructure projects through bonds issued by pri-
vate corporations. The big three CROs emerged in
response to early twentieth century breakdowns in
these markets. Once a number of bonds issued by
private corporations had defaulted or fallen sharply
in value, investors saw the wisdom of employing
expert help in assessing credit risk.
CROs facilitated investment by non-specialist lenders,
diminished asymmetries in information between bor-
rowers and lenders, reduced overlaps in effort and
facilitated comparisons across securities. Their activi-
ties broadened access to capital markets for borrowers
and lenders alike.Over time,CROs evolved a success-
ful methodology for evaluating credit risk, building
their reputations and methods on the statistical per-
formance of hundreds of classifiable securities and the
survival rates of the corporations that issued them.
For bonds issued by well-established corporations,
the value that CROs can add today is reduced by the
wide availability of data on credit spreads and credit
default swaps.But CRO value-added remains high in
assessing the creditworthiness of innovative instru-
ments, illiquid securities and initial public offerings.
How did CROs achieve credibility?
Investors came to trust the judgment of CROs only
after they established a track record for accuracy
and a reputation for independence from both issuers
and firms that distributed rated securities. Initially,
CRO incentives aligned perfectly with those of
investors because their principal source of revenue
1 IOSCO (2008), Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit
Rating Agencies, The Technical Committee of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions, Madrid.was the sale of bond manuals to investors. A CRO
was profitable only to the extent that the value it
added to investors’ assessment of risk made it worth-
while for investors to purchase the manuals.
Over time,the success of incumbent CROs became a
natural barrier to new entrants. Because credibility
came from being successful over time, the lack of a
track record put new firms at a disadvantage. Long
before the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) began to certify CRO reliability, the market
was dominated by the three firms that started the
industry.
When and why did the concerns for accuracy by
CROs and investors diverge?
Two events unraveled the congruence between the
interests of investors and CROs. The first was a
direct consequence of regulatory efforts to out-
source to the CROs a good part of the job of evalu-
ating the creditworthiness of the institutions they
oversaw. The second emerged indirectly as a conse-
quence of technological change.
In the US during and after the Great Depression, na-
tional banks, state insurance regulators, overseers of
pension funds and the SEC believed that they could
use ratings issued by the CROs to control the credit
risk exposure of the institutions that they supervised.
This drove a wedge between the interests of house-
hold and institutional investors.As Partnoy (1999) has
observed, this allowed CROs to add regulatory dis-
pensations to their product line. These dispensations
gave institutions a perverse appetite for over-rated
securities. By purchasing a security whose rating it
knew to be inflated, a firm could reduce the effective
burden of capital requirements without attracting the
disapprobation of government supervisors.
The insistence of various regulators that their regu-
latees hold large amounts of highly-rated assets
boosted the growth of the securitization market.
Inevitably, the demand of regulated institutions for
highly-rated assets far exceeded the supply offered
by highly-rated corporations. Indeed, the number of
non-financial corporations in the United States
receiving this top rating fell from 50 in 1980 to only
2 in 2009.The shortfall could be filled by securitiza-
tions that created synthetic securities if and only to
the extent that CROs would certify that particular
synthetics were equivalent to bonds issued by AAA
and AA-rated corporations.
In recent years, the demand for over-rated debt was
intensified by two further outsourcings of superviso-
ry authority: (1) Supervisors of major US GSEs (i.e.,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) allowed them to ful-
fill congressional mandates for supporting low-
income housing by purchasing AAA-rated tranches
of subprime-related securitizations. GSE demand for
AAA-rated subprime securitization was not very dis-
criminating and was met by a shoddy supply. When
the bubble burst in 2007, the GSEs held roughly half
of outstanding AAA-rated securitizations. (2) Basel
II’s standardized minimum capital standard for inter-
nationally active banks was framed to rely heavily on
CRO ratings.Basel II increased the benefits to CROs
of inflating ratings on synthetics because it allowed
banks to reduce the burden of capital requirements.
Using ratings for regulatory purposes tends to align
the interests of regulated institutional investors with
those of issuers in that they can both benefit from
allowing CROs to overstate credit quality.
Technological change further misaligned the inter-
ests of investors and CROs in ratings accuracy.
Widespread use of copying machines and eventually
faxes and e-mails made it increasingly difficult for
CROs to get users of ratings to pay them for their
work. Revenue from selling bond rating manuals to
investors could not cover costs.For this reason,early
in the 1970s the CROs shifted from asking investors
to buy manuals to requiring issuers to pay to be
rated. Despite the worrisome alignment of issuer
and CRO benefits from inflated ratings that this cre-
ated, CROs convinced investors and regulators that
the value of maintaining their reputation for accura-
cy would obviate the temptation to favor individual
issuers over what had become free-riding investors.
The rise of subprime securitizations steadily under-
cut this claim.At the height of the subprime bubble,
a handful of securitizers could direct billions of dol-
lars a year in revenue to cooperative CROs. 2
In effect, regulators allowed CROs to set capital
requirements for insurance companies, depository
institutions and investment banks and also to deter-
mine what securities were eligible for investment by
public pension funds, mutual funds and money mar-
ket funds. Ratings could even determine whether
particular institutions (e.g., life and bond insurance
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companies) could effectively do business at all. Life
insurers rated below the A category cannot easily
write new business,and guarantees from bond insur-
ers that are not highly rated cannot improve a bor-
rower’s cost of capital enough to earn a breakeven
premium.
Ratings issued by the CROs also became increasing-
ly important in private contracts as well. A ratings
downgrade may accelerate repayments of loans, in-
crease collateral requirements in credit default
swaps, force liquidation of collateral in Collateral-
ized Debt Obligations and accelerate payment under
guaranteed insurance contracts (GICs). Especially
during difficult times, a downgrade could trigger a
downward spiral for the corporation in question,
possibly ending in bankruptcy.
How CROs became NRSROs
Despite the fact that CRO rat-
ings had been used for regulatory
purposes since the 1930s, the
SEC did not specify whose rat-
ings it would rely upon until 1975
when it devised a category of
Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organization (NRSRO).
Initially, applications for this sta-
tus were processed in an opaque
manner through the issuance of
no-action letters and very few
NRSROs were designated. This
system was changed by the Credit
Agency Reform Act of 2006,which
attempted to make NRSRO status
easier to obtain. Still, two years
later, only 10 NRSROs had been
designated. Even now, the big
three CROs dominate the field,
with Moody’s and Standard &
Poors far more important that
Fitch.
It is hard to be sure that enhanc-
ing competition would improve
the quality of ratings because the
data used in the rating process are
not readily available to outside
experts. Competition might in-
crease innovation, lower fees and
improve the accuracy of credit
ratings. Alternatively, it could re-
sult in a race to the bottom if new CROs competed
for market share by offering inflated ratings to issuers
that sought only to borrow more cheaply and to reg-
ulated institutions that wished to hold over-rated
securities as a way to extract safety-net subsidies.
What undermined confidence in CROs?
In 2007–08, an unprecedented wave of downgrades
revealed how badly CROs had rated subprime-relat-
ed securities, collateralized debt obligations, and
other complex securitizations. The worst year for
multinotch downgrades of corporate securities was
2001, which recorded the collapse of Enron, World
Com and the largest sovereign default in history,that
of Argentina.Figure 1 compares the downgrades seen
in 2007 with the downgrades observed for subprime
residential mortgage-backed securities from 2007 to
2008. Even in the year of maximal corporate de-
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obligations.faults, triple-notch downgrades of corporate debt
prove extremely rare. Moreover, such downgrades
were concentrated in the speculative class. In
2007–08, triple-notch downgrades affected nearly 68
percent of BBB-rated subprime securitizations.This
is distressing because BBB is the lower bound that
defines the investment-grade securities that regulat-
ed institutions are generally allowed to hold.
It would be wrong to infer from these data that
CROs did a better job of rating AAA tranches.
Because most subprime securitizations are tranched,
it is necessary to re-rate the lowest-rated tranches
before higher-rated securities can even be analyzed.
Eventually, nearly 60 per cent of the AAA-rated
securities were downgraded by at least three notch-
es (Figure 2).
Whether booked or not, losses occasioned by these
downgrades affected institutions and markets
around the world.Investors lost faith in the ability of
firms and governments to manage risk. It became
clear that monoline insurers no longer had the
reserves to back up their credit guarantees, which
lessened the value of insured municipal bonds. The
weaknesses revealed in the models and samples used
by CROs and other experts to forecast and price risk
called into question the competence of regulators
and senior executives responsible for supervising
these functions. Uncertainty about what institutions
might fail crippled interbank markets and securi-
tized debt hardly traded at all. Figure 3 shows that
for almost a year new issues of privately sponsored
securitizations nearly vanished.
Past and future regulation of CROs
Past experience in the US
Before the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of
2006, the US industry was largely self-regulated.
Subsequent events have shown that the authority
and incentives this legislation assigned to the SEC
were too little, too late and focused on subsidiary
issues.3
The IOSCO code of conduct
During 2004, the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) developed a
“Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating
Agencies.” This code was revised in 2008 to address
some of the problems encountered in structured
securitizations. The code focuses on: (1) the quality
and integrity of the rating process; (2) CRO inde-
pendence and the avoidance of conflicts of interest;
and (3) CRO responsibilities to the investing public
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and issuers.4 The code presumes self-regulation will
continue to prevail. An IOSCO committee would
merely review codes of conduct adopted in national
CROs to determine how closely they adhere to
IOSCO’s Code.IOSCO lacks the resources and legal
authority to implement committee findings and
enforce the code. Such toothless oversight cannot
improve incentives enough either to avoid crises or
to resolve them promptly.
The G-20
The G-20 summits in Washington and London com-
mitted these leading countries to more rigorous reg-
ulation of the CROs. The G-20 pledged “We will
exercise strong oversight over credit rating agencies,
consistent with the agreed and strengthened interna-
tional code of conduct” (G-20, 2008). The London
summit set an implementation deadline requiring
that all G-20 states were to establish a system for
supervising and registering CROs by the end of 2009
(G-20, 2009).The main objective of G-20 regulation
as with the IOSCO code of conduct was the preven-
tion of conflicts of interest.
The EU plan
Ratings firms had been subject to light-touch over-
sight by the Securities and Exchange Commission in
the United States. The European Union was first to
take action to remedy the collapse of confidence in
the work of CROs. More than 40 percent of struc-
tured securities had been placed in Europe and it
was dangerous for EU regulators to suppose that the
historically ineffective US SEC would quickly fix
things.The preamble to the EU regulation on credit
rating agencies (Official Journal of the European
Union 2009, L 302/1) expresses an additional con-
cern: that, despite the importance of credit rating
activity,“most credit rating agencies have their head-
quarters outside the Community. Most Member
States do not regulate the activities of credit rating
agencies or the conditions for the issuing of credit
ratings.”
On 6 May 2009, the European Parliament legislated
that, beginning in 2010, CROs operating in the EU
have to register with the Committee of European
Securities Regulators (CESR) and with the member
nation in which they are based. Provisions are also
made to accept “third country ratings” through an
endorsement system in which an EU-based CRO
must guarantee that the third country ratings are
equivalent to EU standards.Although (EU 2009,55)
“In order to maintain a high level of investor and
consumer confidence and enable the ongoing super-
vision of credit ratings issued in the Community,
credit rating agencies whose headquarters are locat-
ed outside the Community should be required to set
up a subsidiary in the Community in order to allow
for the efficient supervision of their activities in the
Community and the effective use of the endorse-
ment regime.”Day-to-day oversight of the CRO will
be conducted by the home country supervisor and,if
the CRO has branches in several other EU coun-
tries,by a “college”of national supervisors from each
of the countries in which the CRO has major opera-
tions. National regulators will be required to impose
strict rules ranging from disclosure of their models
(although not in such detail that a rival could repli-
cate them) and methodologies to corporate gover-
nance standards. CROs in the EU may not provide
advisory services and they must differentiate the rat-
ings of complex products with a specific symbol.
CROs must also maintain a data repository of out-
comes with CESR that can be accessed by the public
in addition to publishing an annual transparency
report. EU-based CROs must have at least two
directors on their boards whose salary does not
depend on the profits of the CRO and they must cre-
ate an internal function that will review the quality
of their ratings.
Although CESR is supposed to play a coordinating
role regarding standards,some experts have express-
ed concern that national enforcement of EU rules
may lead to differences in the meaning of ratings
even within the EU. It is interesting to note that the
EU perceives an opportunity to gain competitive ad-
vantage by taking charge of the registration process
noting that (EU 2009, 73) “The Commission should
also submit a report to the European Parliament and
the Council assessing incentives for issuers to use
credit ratings agencies established in the Community
for a portion of their ratings.”5
4 IOSCO (2008), Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit
Rating Agencies, Madrid.
5 Utzig (2010) notes that “Contrary to policymakers’ intentions,the
creation of a European CRA could result in investors considering
the ratings of European companies and structured finance products
to be of lower quality than the ratings of companies in other
regions.This would have an adverse effect on the funding opportu-
nities and costs of European firms and would weaken the EU
financial market. An inappropriate attempt of this kind to boost
competition in the ratings market could thus damage the reputa-
tion of credit ratings as a whole and fly in the face of the actual
objective of state regulation.”The US plan 
The US response has been much slower and more
tentative. The SEC has adopted amendments for
NRSROs to make additional public disclosures
about their methodologies for determining struc-
tured finance ratings and the histories of their rat-
ings. They will also be required to maintain internal
records to help strengthen examinations by the SEC.
Like the EU,the SEC has prohibited NRSROs from
advising a client on how to obtain a particular rating
and then rating the security.
In September 2009 the SEC adopted additional
amendments regarding broader disclosures of ratings
histories such as the initial rating and any actions sub-
sequently taken including downgrades,upgrades,affir-
mations and placements on watch lists.They also cre-
ated a mechanism for NRSROs that were not hired to
rate structured finance products to nonetheless deter-
mine and monitor credit ratings for these issues. This
would help investors by providing a greater diversity
of views and could help foster new entrants in the rat-
ing industry.
At the end of January 2010,the SEC has a number of
proposals outstanding for comment that ultimately
may or may not be adopted. Several proposals are
designed to help investors understand which issuers
generate the most revenue for the CRO,presumably
to limit the scope for conflicts of interest. Another
proposal would require disclosure of preliminary
credit ratings in certain circumstances so that in-
vestors have enhanced information about whether
“ratings shopping” has occurred that might bear on
the quality or reliability of the ratings.
Perhaps the most potentially powerful proposal is
designed to enhance the accountability of the rating
firms by lifting their current exemption from “ex-
perts” liability under the Securities Act for ratings
used by issuers and other offering participants to
market securities.This could make them accountable
for their ratings under these conditions,which would
be an enormous increase in accountability.But there
is no way of telling which, if any of these, proposed
amendments will be adopted and enforced.
On the legislative front, the House of Representa-
tives has completed a bill, while the Senate has not.
The House bill seeks to strengthen the regulation of
ratings agencies,but there is no way to tell what parts
of the bill will ever become law.Nonetheless,its pro-
visions indicate how the House of Representatives
and, to a considerable extent, the Obama adminis-
tration is thinking about CRO regulation.
The House bill would require that all NRSROs be
registered.This would subject them to fines and other
penalties for violating applicable laws. The SEC
would be required to conduct an annual review of
each NRSRO to verify that each maintains, adheres
to and discloses: internal controls, due diligence and
sound methodologies for determining credit ratings.
Disclosure requirements would be increased in several
dimensions. First, with regard to information disclosed
by the sponsor, issuer and underwriter, the collateral
underlying the structured securities is to be complete-
ly disclosed. Second, with respect to information dis-
closed by the CRO to the public,the CRO must collect
and disclose information about how the sponsor,issuer
and underwriter of structured securities assess the
accuracy and integrity of their data. CROs must main-
tain a public web site to disclose historical default rates
for all classes of rated financial products. CROs must
publicly and for free disclose performance information
in initial ratings and subsequent changes to enable
investors to compare performance across credit rating
firms. Furthermore, an attestation must accompany
each credit rating issued affirming that no influence
was exerted on the rating process through the CRO’s
other business activities. Each NRSRO must disclose
its ratings history to the SEC in EDGAR-consistent
format so that it can easily be understood by the pub-
lic, and CROs must include an extensive disclosure
with each credit rating it publishes.
The bill would also require disclosures by the issuer
to the public.These would include disclosure of any
preliminary ratings received from a credit rating
organization. In addition, inside information that an
issuer discloses to the CRO is no longer exempt from
Regulation Fair Disclosure, effectively eliminating
the informational advantages that CROs have often
claimed to enjoy in the past.
The bill would enhance accountability by subjecting
NRSROs to enforcement actions and legal liability.
Penalties, including fines, are specified for miscon-
duct.And NRSROs can be sued under private rights
of action for gross negligence.A private party would
receive the right to recover damages if it can estab-
lish that a rating was both grossly negligent and a
substantial fact in the investor’s decision to buy the
security.
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The bill would reduce conflicts of interest by requir-
ing each NRSRO to establish, maintain and enforce
written policies and procedures reasonably designed
to address, manage and disclose any conflicts of
interest that can arise from its business. The SEC is
required in turn to review such policies.
The bill also requires credit rating firms to establish,
maintain and enforce written procedures for their
methodologies and an internal control system
designed to ensure they are enforced. It permits the
SEC to require CROs to establish rating symbols
that distinguish structured products ratings from
other ratings. It requires the SEC to issue rules that
would make credit rating firms establish, maintain
and enforce written policies and procedures to
ensure that ratings are clear and consistent, and
requires a written certification for any third-party
provider of due diligence services used in establish-
ing a rating.
Perhaps the single most daring feature of the House
bill is to require the removal of numerous statutory
references to credit ratings and to require agencies
to modify regulations to remove references to or
reliance upon credit ratings and substitute an alter-
native standard of creditworthiness.
The bill also establishes corporate governance re-
quirements for NRSROs.Independent directors must
comprise 1/3 of their board of directors and exercise
specified oversight responsibility. Each NRSRO must
designate a compliance officer that reports to the
board and submits an annual report to the SEC that
the officer certifies to be accurate and complete. To
carry out its new duties, the SEC must establish an
SEC Credit Ratings Office of sufficient size to admin-
ister SEC rules and the SEC must establish a 7-mem-
ber Credit Ratings Agency Advisory Board to advise
the SEC concerning its rules and to ensure the SEC
carries out its oversight responsibilities.
None of the proposals addresses a glaring gap in the
usefulness of ratings information. By and large,
CROs focus only on point estimates and on too few
variables. Two of the three dominant CROs claim
only to estimate the probability of default, while the
third goes on to estimate the value of loss given de-
fault. But statistics has always stressed interval esti-
mation, and portfolio theory shows that a security-
by-security rating of credit risk analysis is inade-
quate.In large portfolios,an individual issuer’s prob-
ability of default matters less than the probability
that many securities will default at the same time.So
long as ratings neglect standard deviations and cor-
relations in default probabilities across asset classes,
ratings would remain of limited value even if CRO
conflicts of interest were well managed and all pro-
posed reforms were enacted.
Self-regulation: ethical standards versus business
practices
Recognizing credit rating as a profession
To the extent that CROs act in a fiduciary capacity,
top managers and ratings personnel owe clients
duties of loyalty,competence and care.Experts make
probabilistic assessments of the likelihood and con-
sequences of default on individual securities and on
different tranches of structured securitizations. Both
within and across firms, expert assessments can dif-
fer widely in quality. Conscientious professional em-
ployees should want to subject themselves to an in-
centive structure that encourages each expert to pro-
vide his or her best assessment of default probabili-
ties, loss given default, correlations and standard
errors of estimate and to do this not only when a secu-
rity is issued but also to update these assessments
promptly when and as conditions change.As in other
professions that combine art with science, the most
effective way to achieve that goal is through height-
ened transparency that permits experts to review and
critique one another’s methods and assessments.
Property rights to work product can be established
through the patent process.
Over time, peer interaction can judge which experts
are especially creative and what methods are pricing
market outcomes most accurately. If incentive com-
patibility were established at the enterprise level, ac-
curate work will be worth more to employers because
it will reduce uncertainty to final investors and enable
issuers to borrow on more favorable terms.
Establishing standards of best business practice
Singly or in concert, governments could convene a
board of leading participants in securitization mar-
kets and give them a mandate to improve the trans-
parency of the securitization process and set stan-
dards of practice that would realign the incentives of
loan originators,securitizers and CROs with those of
final investors.Herring and Levinson (2009) propose
that this be done by a Securitization Transaction Ap-proval Review (STAR) board. Board membership
would be tilted toward leading institutional investors:
pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies,
banks and endowments. However, it would also in-
clude various service providers – underwriting invest-
ment banks, originating lenders, lawyers, accountants,
rating firms and monoline insurers – on the grounds
that such enterprises share an interest in revitalizing
and properly incentivizing the securitization process.
Not every tranche of every securitization can be
rated adequately using existing data or models and
investors need to know when a rating is and is not
particularly dicey. Investors would be assured that
securitizations awarded the STAR standard meet
industry-wide best practices for transparency, dili-
gence,documentation,statistical modeling and infor-
mation communication.It would also certify that the
financial incentives of all service providers line up
with the interests of final investors. By reducing
agency costs engendered by the securitization
process itself, the STAR label can allow investors to
price the fundamental risks inherent in each deal
without having to worry about pricing substantial
amounts of unresolved incentive conflict.
STAR evaluation requires for all service providers
the establishment and regular reassessment of ex-
plicit best practices. STAR committees would adjust
and refine the standards over time. For example,
CROs would be expected to opine on the credit
quality of the securities based on criteria that STAR
would specify. We would expect STAR to enforce
rigorous transparency requirements such as: (1) full
disclosure of the assumptions a CRO uses in assign-
ing a given rating; (2) full disclosure of all informa-
tion received from the sponsor of a securitization;
and (3) disclosure of statistical or stress tests design-
ed to estimate the stability of the rating to changes in
circumstances and assumptions. CROs would not be
required to disclose the parameters or forms of their
models but only to the extent that this is proprietary
information. CRO personnel ought to be given in-
centives to report upon and improve the accuracy of
their models. Rating personnel need to be closely
scrutinized concerning assumptions they make about
correlations in the underlying collateral.
Lawyers and underwriting investment bankers
would be required to assume an affirmative obliga-
tion to look for and report undisclosed information
about correlations in the underlying collateral or
anomalies in the securitization structure that might
adversely affect performance.Most importantly,they
would be required to align incentives between ser-
vice providers and investors. Fees paid to each party
in the securitization process should be subject to
claw backs and deferred compensation, where ap-
propriate. And the CROs would be subject to the
same kind of liability as other professionals. In this
way providers of securitization services would be
exposed to loss if the loans held as collateral were to
default and they would share the economic risks of
the transaction as partners with the investors.
Conclusion
Aligning the interests of agents and final investors
has been a problem because conflicts exist between
the goals of maximizing the value of CRO profits
and protecting the wealth of other parties.The fidu-
ciary responsibilities of CROs must be defined and
enforced because history shows that they cannot
simply be presumed.Widespread dissatisfaction with
the performance of the CRO industry before and
during the securitization crisis has not been accom-
panied by a consensus about how its activities should
be reformed.By moving in uncoordinated directions,
legislation in the US and EU threatens to undermine
the efficiency of world credit markets. Authorities
have yet to deal effectively with the root problems of
improving the transparency of the ratings process
and realigning the incentives of the CROs, issuers,
regulators and investors. To diminish pressure for
grade inflation, governments should remove ratings
from all rules and regulations.This would encourage
experts of all kinds to advise investors on the credit
quality of securities and institutional portfolios. To
the contrary, regulators in most countries have sig-
naled a continued willingness to rely on CRO ratings
in overseeing the institutions they supervise. Re-
gulatory reliance on CRO ratings tempts CROs to
inflate ratings and reduces incentives for regulators
and regulated investors to conduct their own inde-
pendent analyses.
Participants in the securitization process realize the
need to restore confidence in the process. Trust can
only be increased by establishing ground rules that
improve transparency and establish better incen-
tives.It is appropriate to allow the details of plans for
doing this to be proposed by insiders who fully under-
stand the ins and outs of the securitization process,
but it is equally appropriate to insist that govern-
ments and other outsiders formally test insider plans
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so as to identify and eliminate burdens they might
impose on taxpayers and other unrepresented groups.
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